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ABSTRACT
For the purposes of conservation or suppression of species, gene
drive technology has significant potential. Theoretically speaking,
with the release of even relatively few animals with gene drive
systems in an ecosystem, beneficial or harmful genes could be
introduced into the entire wild-type population of that species.
Given the profound impact that gene drives could have on
species and ecosystems, their use is a highly contentious issue.
Communities and groups have differing beliefs about nature and
its conservation or preservation, as well as concerns about the
ecological safety of the eradication, replacement or enhancement
of particular species of animals by means of genetic engineering.
For all those reasons, the rigorous regulation of insects and other
animals with gene drive systems is crucial. In this paper, we
consider the question of whether the United States Food and
Drug Administration is prepared to effectively regulate insects and
other animals with gene drives.
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Introduction
The release of animals with gene drive systems in the wild could significantly affect eco-
systems. The technology can be used to change, suppress and even eliminate particular
species. Given considerable uncertainty and low levels of knowledge about the impact
of the technology, the regulation of animals, including insects, with gene drives will be
necessary. In the United States (US), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may
well be responsible for regulating some animals with gene drives. Although it has not
yet conducted risk assessment of animals with gene drives, in this article, we evaluate
its preparedness to undertake that task. We also make suggestions for improving its
risk assessment protocol so that it can conduct thorough risk evaluations of such animals.
Usually, an introduced gene is carried on one of a pair of chromosomes, and is thus
inherited by about half of the offspring in the first generation (exhibiting Mendelian
inheritance). Eventually, the gene becomes diluted in the natural population if it brings
no selective advantage to the organism. With a gene drive system based on CRISPR/
Cas9,1 an edited gene on one chromosome can copy itself onto the partner chromosome
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(Esvelt et al. 2014). The result is that nearly all offspring inherit the engineered gene. In
organisms with short generation times and random mating, an engineered gene could
be integrated across a large population within a season.
As of August 2017, animals with gene drive systems (with some exception)2 are under
the regulatory purview of the FDA. In 2016, the FDA approved field trials for Oxitec’s
genetically engineered (GE)3 strain of the mosquito Aedes aegypti intended to the
reduce population of its wild type.4 In this article, we assess the preparedness of the
FDA to regulate animals with gene drives by scrutinizing its risk assessment of the
Oxitec GE mosquito. In doing so, we mirror the approach taken by the National
Academy of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM). A 2016 NASEM report uses
the World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines for ‘regular’ GE insects like Oxitec’s
OX513A GE mosquito to discuss risk assessment for animals with gene drive systems.
The FDA will regulate mosquitoes that are ‘intended to reduce the virus/pathogen load
within a mosquito, or products intended to prevent mosquito-borne disease in humans or
animals’ (FDA 2017). Furthermore, the regulatory system (including the laws and risk
assessment requirements) initially used in 2016 for the OX153A mosquito is the same
one that would be used to regulate most animals with gene drives (White House [2015]
2016). In addition, both the OX153A mosquito and possibly some animals with gene
drives will be designed for the purposes of population suppression or elimination of
their wild type. Thus, our analysis of the FDA’s risk assessment of the Oxitec GE mosquito
will usefully indicate FDA’s readiness to rigorously evaluate mosquitos with gene drives.
Also, it will identify ways in which the FDA’s risk assessment protocol could be improved.
Given significant warranted concerns about mosquito transmission of diseases like
malaria, Dengue and the Zika virus, mosquitos with gene drive systems may be the first
animals with gene drives that are released in the ‘wild.’ Recent laboratory studies have
demonstrated their potential effectiveness in replacing or eliminatingmosquito populations
(Gantz et al. 2015; Hammond et al. 2016). So, under the foresight goal of anticipatory gov-
ernance (Barben et al. 2008), we use the OX513A mosquito case to anticipate and prepare
for the oversight of gene drives in animals, particularly mosquitos.
In part one, we identify the normative concerns that influence the FDA’s regulatory
review. In part two, we analyze and evaluate the FDA’s regulatory review of Oxitec’s
GE mosquito.5 Specifically, we scrutinize the draft environmental assessment (EA) pre-
pared by Oxitec and submitted to the FDA, and the agency’s preliminary assessment of
it (i.e. its Finding of No Significant Impact statement). We make the case that the
agency’s risk evaluation is not as rigorous as it could be. We also discuss the relevance
of our analysis for risk evaluation of insects with gene drive systems. We close the
paper by calling for the FDA to establish a transparent and democratic regulatory
review process for new genetically engineered organisms (GEOs). This will enable it to
more rigorously evaluate animals with gene drives and inspire warranted public confi-
dence in its regulatory efforts and adhere to the 2016 NASEM recommendations about
public engagement in decision-making about the use of animals with gene drives.
FDA’s normative commitments6
In identifying and analyzing the FDA’s normative commitments, we follow in the foot-
steps of other researchers. Jasanoff, for instance, has analyzed the role of political
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culture in shaping the approach to risk assessment taken by different nations (2005, 21–
22). Parthasarathy (2012) too has made the case that national context influences scientific
and technological development, including systems of regulatory oversight. We extend
their analyses by detailing the influence of neoliberalism on the US FDA’s regulatory
framework.
The FDA claims that its regulatory review of GEOs is solely science-based, and that it
does not engage with normative questions. For instance, the FDA Center for Veterinarian
Medicine has stated that it is not part of the agency’s mission to engage with the public’s
ethical or economic concerns (FDA, CVM 2008, ii–iii; also see Meghani and Melo-Martín
2009). For example, the agency noted that the majority of public comments expressed
opposition to GE animals for a multitude of reasons,
including that manipulating the genomes of animals in ways that could alter their fundamen-
tal natures was, in and of itself, unethical or immoral, that experimenting with animals was
wrong, that genetic engineering may have adverse social and economic consequences, that it
is not possible to predict what such technology might lead to… (FDA 2008, Section K)
In response, the FDA claimed neutrality towards these issues when it responded to public
comments on its draft guidance for industry about the regulation of GE animals (FDA
2008, Section K), asserting that those subjects were:
… largely outside the scope of FDA’s authority. The statutory and regulatory review and
approval requirements for NADAs [i.e. new animal drug application] ensure that only
drugs that are safe and effective are approved… The moral, ethical, and socioeconomic
issues outlined above do not fall within the scope of the guidance. It is FDA’s intent,
however, that the regulatory approach described in the guidance will provide a predictable
science-based framework that will ensure the safety and safe use of GE animals. (FDA
2008, Section K, italics added)
While the agency claims that it is not influenced by any ethical, political, religious or socio-
economic considerations, normative considerations invariably shape risk evaluations (see,
for instance, Meghani 2017a). Moreover, we contend that since the 1980s, the agency has
been influenced by neoliberal considerations (see also Meghani 2017b).
The neoliberalization of the FDA
In 1938, the FDA was established by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)
(Barley 2007) as a reaction to the public health disaster caused by the drug company Mas-
sengill marketing diethylene glycol as treatment for streptococcal infections in children.
The company had been selling the chemical without conducting any safety testing; its
action resulted in numerous deaths (Barley 2007). The FDA was created to ensure that
manufacturers of drugs and food did not cause harm to public health as they attempted
to profit from their products. The agency aimed to provide the public with access to
the safest food and pharmaceutical products and most efficacious medical products at
the lowest possible cost to society.7
The implementation of neoliberal reforms has had substantial significance for the
agency’s regulatory function. According to neoliberalism, the state should have a
minimal role in the economy so that the commercial sector can flourish, which, in
turn, will benefit motivated, enterprising individuals (Harvey 2005). Many nations have
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implemented neoliberal policies because they read them as serving their national interests.
The US, for instance, justified its adoption of neoliberal policies on the grounds that they
would benefit American companies, and thus, US interests (see Meghani 2017b).
The neoliberalization of the FDA began in the 1980s with the Reagan administration
issuing Executive Order #12291, which scrutinized existing and new regulations to
evaluate their economic impact (Federal Register 1981). The aim of the Order was to
cut down or entirely dispense with federal government regulations, with the end of
allowing the private sector to govern itself because (the administration believed) it
would stimulate economic growth, raise productivity and reduce the cost of doing
business (Reagan 1982).
A year earlier, in 1981, George A. Keyworth (President Reagan’s Chief Science Advisor)
had given testimony before the House of Representatives’ Committee on Science and
Technology, emphasizing that enterprising individuals and the private sector should
take the lead in science and technology, with the federal government reducing its role.
The FDA was targeted by the Reagan administration for neoliberalization because it
was ‘quite good at confronting businesses and reigning in their profit-seeking behavior
if their interests conflicted with the public interest’ (Markel 2005, 2490). But a key
problem with neoliberal theory is that it fails to acknowledge that the industry’s interests
(of maximizing profits) can be at odds with the public interest, in this case, protecting
public health and the environment.
Neoliberalization of the regulation of biotechnology
The neoliberalization of the US biotechnology regulatory framework and FDA’s policies
for food biotechnology have their roots in the 1986 Coordinated Framework on the Regu-
lation of Biotechnology (CFRB) (Meghani 2017b). Issued by the White House’s Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the policy framework was the nation’s first key
regulatory document about GEOs. The CFRB asserted that GE food should be treated
the same as their non-GE counterparts and therefore no new laws were needed to regulate
GE food and the products of biotechnology. This policy stance was justified on the
grounds that it would allow the US to lead and dominate the global development of
and trade in biotechnology (Federal Register 1984; Levidow, Murphy, and Carr 2007, 34).
In 1992, the FDA published a guidance document for industry outlining a process by
which biotechnology companies could voluntarily consult with the agency about new
plant varieties developed using genetic engineering (FDA 1992). This Guidance formally
established the kind of close relationship between the state (in this case, a regulatory
agency) and industry that neoliberalism advocates.8 FDA reviewers were formally
instructed to no longer to be at arm’s length from the developers (or sponsors) of new bio-
technologies. An aim of the agency now became to help sponsors of new food products get
approval so that they could bring GE products to market as soon as possible (Hilts 2003,
228). For example, in the 1992 Guidance, the FDA identified itself as concerned with the
best interests of the GE food industry (which it aligned with its own interest):
FDA believes that it is in the best interests of the regulated industry and the agency for devel-
opers to inform FDA, as discussed below, prior to commercial distribution, about foods or
feed derived from new plant varieties, including those derived using rDNA techniques…
(FDA 1992)
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In 2017, 31 years after the original CFRB was issued, the US issued a revised CFRB. As a
precursor to the 2017 CFRB, in 2015, the White House issued a ‘Memorandum on Mod-
ernizing the Regulatory System for Biotechnology Products’ (White House [2015] 2016).
The memo revealed the state’s continued commitment to a neoliberal worldview. It
initiated a process to ‘clarify’ the 1986 CFRB to ‘ensure public confidence in the regulatory
system and to prevent unnecessary barriers to future innovation and competitiveness by
improving the transparency, coordination, predictability and efficiency of the regulation of
biotechnology products while continuing to protect health and the environment.’9 This
statement expressed a commitment to fostering innovation and trade competitiveness
(and, thus, corporate biotechnology interests) that seems to go beyond regulations that
protect human health and the environment. In fact, it appears to treat fostering innovation
and global market competitiveness (and thus, industry interests) as having the same
importance as protecting and advancing public health.
In the case of gene drive technology, the model for innovation is likely to include non-
profit organizations interested in community health or conservation (e.g. Target Malaria
project) (see also Kuzma et al. 2017), in addition to for-profit companies. The push for
innovation and market entry would favor the development of GE mosquitos, whether
their sponsors are non-profit organizations or for-profit entities. Next, we analyze the
FDA’s risk assessment of the Oxitec mosquito. We believe that the agency’s evaluation
is not as rigorous as it could and should be.
FDA’s review of Oxitec’s (draft) EA
In this section, we delineate the policy framework for the FDA’s regulatory authority over
GE animals. Then we analyze and evaluate the (draft) environmental risk assessment for
the GE mosquito (OX513A) submitted to the FDA by Oxitec as part of its application to
the agency and the FDA’s (preliminary) evaluation of that report (i.e. FONSI) in making
its decision about whether to approve field trials of the OX513A mosquito. We make the
case that the FDA’s (draft) Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) is not justified given
the data that was provided to the agency by Oxitec.
The FDA has claimed regulatory authority over certain GE animals (including insects
that are not plant pests) by evoking the FFDCA, the CFRB and the FDA’s own Guidance
(2009). The 2009 Guidance delineates the agency’s regulatory policy for GE animals,
including insects. The Guidance (2009) treats GE animals as ‘new animal drugs’
(NADs) because the intentionally altered genomic DNA introduced in the animals is
meant to impact their bodily structure or function. The FFDCA construes as a drug all
non-food articles that are meant ‘to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man or other animals’ (21 U.S. Code 321, section 201(g)). Developers of GE animals
must submit a new animal drug application (NADA) to the FDA’s Center for Veterinary
Medicine (CVM). The NADA applies to the intentionally altered genomic DNA in the
animal. Thus, the agency regulates the article in the GE animal, not the GE animal as a
whole (FDA-CVM 2009; revised 2015 & 2017, 6), despite using language suggesting regu-
lation of the animal as a whole (FDA-CVM 2009, 7; see also Meghani 2017b). Under the
current FDA regulatory system, animals with gene drives would be classified as NADs.
The FDA’s decision to regulate GE animals under the FFDCA NAD provisions has
ethical and political consequences. For example, the NAD process allows developers of
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GE animals to claim that crucial details about the biotechnology are trade secrets, shield-
ing them from public scrutiny. Specific to animal drugs and the NAD provisions 21 C.F.R.
§ 514.11b, the FDA is barred from making public that it is reviewing an NADA until the
NAD approval has come out in the Federal Register (unless it has been disclosed or
acknowledged by the sponsor of the drug (Otts 2014)). For instance, because the Aqua-
Bounty GE salmon and the Oxitec GE mosquito were classified as NADs by the FDA,
the biotechnology companies did not have to disclose to the public that they had sub-
mitted an Investigational NAD (INAD) application to the FDA. However, the developers
of the two GE animals voluntarily made it public that their products were under review at
the FDA; they shared the risk assessments with the public in the draft comment phase of
the regulatory review process. Our larger point is that the state (including the FDA) serves
industry interests by making it legal for corporations to not disclose to the public that they
have submitted an application for a new drug for regulatory approval. If GE animals were
regulated by other agencies, such as Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) under the Endan-
gered Species Act or the Lacey Act, the public could have greater access to information
about them as the information would not be subject to the more stringent protections
under the FDA’s NAD provisions. Instead, the agencies would be able to notify the
public that products are under review and share draft documents and assessments
during the review, as the Freedom of Information Act generally requires federal agencies
to disclose information (Unlu 2009). For example, on its website, the USDA puts out
notice of the ongoing review of GE plants when a petition for deregulation is filed and
before a decision is made (USDA 2017).
Gene drives in insects and other animals are likely to be subsumed under the same pro-
visions and regulatory processes as the OX153A mosquito. Therefore, in the interest of
anticipating and preparing for gene drive governance, it is instructive to look at the regu-
latory review and risk analysis process for the OX153A mosquito and consider ways for
improving them. Both the OX153A mosquito and insects with gene drives designed for
population suppression will contain engineered genes that do not allow the offspring to
survive and are designed to spread to reach the wild population in the target areas. The
assumption is that the GE mosquitos will mate with the wild population, resulting in
the decrease in its numbers. The potential categories of ecological risks associated with
the spread of both types of engineered mosquito populations are also similar (see
NASEM 2017, and more on this later), although the time and geographic scales may differ.
But it must be acknowledged that there are differences between the Oxitec mosquito
and gene drive mosquitos. For example, in the case of the OX153A mosquito, continuous
releases of large batches of engineered mosquitos will be needed to eliminate the wild
population. With a gene drive mosquito, fewer releases and smaller numbers of insects
are likely to be required to wipe out an entire population (assuming close to 100% inheri-
tance of gene drives with each generation, versus 50% inheritance of the OX513A killing
gene with each generation) (Burt 2003). It is beyond the scope of this project to compare
how an actual risk assessment for the two (the OX153Amosquito versus a mosquito with a
gene drive) would differ at each stage of the process, as natural scientists and risk assessors
are still debating these issues (NASEM 2016).10
This paper argues that the risk analysis process for GE animals under the NAD pro-
visions is flawed in its interpretation of the data and uncertainties. While this complicates
managing risk for both the OX153A mosquito and gene drives (see below), the problems
S208 Z. MEGHANI AND J. KUZMA
may be exacerbated with gene drives because of their (anticipated) greater effectiveness in
spreading genes in wild populations. With the OX153A technology, if the mosquitos
releases are discontinued (e.g. because of a report of an unanticipated ecological event),
it is more likely that the wild population would recover than in the case where gene
drives are used.
The Oxitec mosquito: assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act
The GE mosquito (OX153A) is designed to suppress wild populations of A. aegypti in
regions with Dengue fever and the Zika virus, with the aim of decreasing viral trans-
mission to humans (FDA-CVM 2016). The OX153A GE mosquito passes a lethal gene
to its offspring, which, in the absence of tetracycline,11 causes them to die (Harris et al.
2012). While the OX153A mosquito strain of the A. aegypti mosquito does not contain
a gene drive that propagates through super-Mendelian inheritance, it results in an effect
similar to mosquitos with gene drives designed to suppress mosquito populations for
human disease control (Burt 2003; Esvelt et al. 2014). Thus, in a sense, it is a precursor
to insects engineered with population-suppressing gene drives. The result is the same –
to decrease the presence of a pest using a GE animal.
The FDA must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as it con-
siders field trials for GE animals, including the Oxitec GEmosquito (under the NADA and
the FDA’s 2009 Guidance (for GE animals)). The FDA construes field trials as analogous
to clinical trials of NADs. The FDA reviewed the OX153A mosquito under the INAD pro-
visions of the FDCA, and in summer 2016, published its final assessment documents (con-
sisting of Oxitec’s EA report for the GEmosquito and the agency’s own FONSI statement),
approving field trials. The Oxitec mosquito was slated for release in the US Florida Keys,
where cases of Dengue had been documented and there was concern about Zika.12 The
OX153A mosquito has thus far been released in Brazil, Malaysia, the Cayman Islands
and Panama. In those locations, it has been shown to reduce the target wild-type mosquito
population in field trials (Nimmo and Beech 2016). However, from our analysis of Oxitec’s
(draft) EA report and the FDA’s (preliminary) FONSI, it appears that Oxitec has not pro-
vided the FDA with any data on the ecological monitoring of non-target organisms or
other environmental endpoints related to those releases.
NEPA requires that federal agencies follow established environmental review pro-
cedures, which include evaluating and documenting the environmental impact of any sig-
nificant federal action. Regulations under NEPA (40 CFR 1500–1508) establish three levels
of environmental review with progressively greater detail and rigor: categorical exclusions,
EA and environmental impact statements (EIS). The EIS is the most robust EA; in con-
trast, classification as ‘categorical exclusion’ means that no environmental evaluation is
required. While the FDA has to abide by NEPA (as mentioned above), the agency’s regu-
latory decisions about GE animals are based on its authority under the FFDCA, the NAD
provisions and the 2009 Guidance (on GE animals). Under the FFDCA, the FDA evaluates
the safety of the drug for the animal on which it will be used, and it assesses the efficacy of
the drug (i.e. does it do what it claims to do?). The product developer submits an INAD for
clinical trials (in the case of Oxitec’s GE mosquito, field trials function as clinical trials),
and then after the trials are conducted, the developer submits a NAD application for inter-
state commerce. The FDA uses NEPA to better address broader environmental concerns
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and motivate product developers to attend to those concerns in their own risk manage-
ment plans.
Compliance with NEPA has been a point of contention in the regulation of GEOs gen-
erally. Lawsuits have been brought against the USDA by consumer and environmental
groups on the grounds that the agency did not adequately assess environmental endpoints
(as required by NEPA) for GE plants because it did not choose its most rigorous option,
i.e. the drafting of EIS (reviewed in Cowan and Alexander 2012). Several consumer and
environmental groups are suing the FDA for its recent approval of the GE AquaBounty
Salmon, and one reason for the lawsuit is the lack of an EIS (see, for instance, Keat
et al. v. U.S. DHHS FDA 2016).
For the OX513A GE mosquito, the FDAmade the decision that an EA was sufficient and
therefore allowed Oxitec to submit a (draft) EA report as part of its INAD application. After
reviewing Oxitec’s application, the agency issued a (preliminary (i.e. draft)) FONSI docu-
ment. This choice has ethical and political import given the uncertainty and novelty of
the GE ‘product’ and its purpose. Notably, mosquitos are mobile organisms, and the
intended aim for GE mosquitos is for them to mate with their wild-type counterpart,
decreasing their population size. Our point is that the aim of strict containment of the GE
mosquito in a ‘clinical trial’ (or field trial in this case) is at odds with the motivation under-
lying the release of the OX153A mosquito. Careful attention to assessing ecological impacts
prior to release is important for this GE insect, and for all GE animals with gene drives.
The conundrum in the case of GE animals designed to spread andmate with wild popu-
lations is that in order to test the efficacy of this new animal ‘drug’ in a field trial (in this
case, manifested by wild type A. aegypti population suppression), the organism needs to
spread to wild populations of its species. This also means that the GE animal will come
into contact with non-target species as they spread. Unanticipated consequences of the
release of the GE insect during the so-called field trials (i.e. INAD period) thus constitute
a serious concern. The FDA’s decision to accept this uncertainty by allowing for the open
release of the OX513A mosquito, without rigorous prior analysis to support its safety (e.g.
in an EIS), is worrisome. It brings into focus the tension between its obligation to protect
public health and duty imposed on it to foster biotechnological innovation. The agency’s
decision carries ethical and political significance. It would have been better if the agency
had prepared the (rigorous) EIS, and considered in detail the potential ecological impacts,
societal ramifications and tradeoffs compared to alternatives. It is also worth considering
that by opting to give environmental concerns less attention by preparing an EA report
rather than an EIS, the FDA is opening itself up to additional lawsuits from non-govern-
mental organizations concerned about GE animals and their ecological impacts. More-
over, the agency’s evaluation of the (draft) assessment documents for the OX153A
mosquito (FDA 2016; Oxitec 2016) makes several unwarranted assumptions. But we do
not read these shortcomings as a sign of epistemic incompetence of FDA risk assessors.
Rather, we interpret them as evidence of the agency’s attempt to foster the biotechnology
industry’s interests, even as it seeks to attend to its mission of protecting public health.
The Oxitec mosquito: FDA’s decision to review a GE insect as a NAD
The OX513A mosquito strain has been engineered to include genes that in the absence of
tetracycline will kill the organism in the larval stage. Because female mosquitos are the
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ones that bite, Oxitec aims to release only GE male mosquitos. But with an approximate
99.9% efficiency rate, 0.1% or about one out of a thousand GE female mosquitos will be
inadvertently released (Oxitec 2016). The strain also has a marker gene from marine
coral, DSRed2, that allows for detection of mosquitos containing the engineered genes,
as well as other DNA sequences from Cabbage moth, Drosophila and E. coli that regulate
the genes and help insert it into the host’s genome.
Oxitec’s INAD trial is designed
to evaluate the mating ability of the OX153A male mosquitoes with local wild type non-GE
Aedes aegypti females, to assess the survival to functional adulthood of the resulting
progeny inheriting the #OX513 rDNA construct as compared to local non-GE progeny,
and to estimate the efficacy of sustained releases of OX513A male mosquitoes for the sup-
pression of the local population of A. aegypti in the described release area in the Florida
Keys. (Oxitec 2016, 37)
Thus, the field trial for which Oxitec is seeking approval (from the FDA) is designed to
evaluate, first, the drug (i.e. rDNA construct) safety with respect to the animal, which is
the lab-raised GE mosquito (the gene is designed to kill the progeny in the wild),13 and
second, drug effectiveness (how well does the GE mosquito or its rDNA construct
reduce the target A. aegypti mosquito population). There is no mention in Oxitec’s
description of the field trial of assessing and collecting data on the potential, unanticipated
impacts on local ecosystems (including non-target organisms), horizontal gene flow,
effects on prey of the mosquito and many other relevant factors (i.e. endpoints) (Oxitec
2016, 37–38).14 This omission has normative significance because it limits the scope of
the regulatory assessments to very few outcomes and omits various other relevant impacts.
Presumably, the FDA is aware that the goals of Oxitec’s proposed field trial are very
limited, but it has not urged the biotechnology company to study other relevant outcomes.
The FDA’s FONSI appears to unquestioningly accept the agenda set by the biotechnology
company:
The goals of the proposed investigational trial are to evaluate the breeding of the OX513A
mosquitoes with local wild-type Aedes aegypti females, to assess the survival of the resultant
progeny, and to estimate the suppression of the overall Aedes aegypti population at the trial
site relative to an untreated comparator area. (FDA 2016, 2)
Thus, the FDA regulatory process for the GE mosquito is primarily concerned with deter-
mining the efficacy of the ‘drug.’
GE animals with gene drives will probably be under the same FDA regulations as the
OX153A mosquito. As argued above, the FDA has claimed authority over certain GE
animals by classifying them as NADs. This categorization means that field trials of new
GE animals are likely to be limited to assessment of the introduced gene’s effectiveness
as a drug or safety for the animal in which it is introduced. At this point in time, we
have found no evidence that the regulatory review of animals with gene drives under
FDA will be subject to more comprehensive ecological assessment than in the case of
the OX513A mosquito. We worry the limited focus means that during the review
process the effects of the introduction of animals with gene drives on non-target organ-
isms, biodiversity and indirect impacts on human health and the socioeconomic circum-
stances of various groups may not receive sufficient attention.
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Assumptions about GE mosquito survival probability and possibility of spread in
the wild
Oxitec’s EA statement indicates that up to 5% of the GE mosquito population with OX513
tTAV genes may survive in the absence of tetracycline (Oxitec 2016, 52). If 5% of the
second generation progeny survive (with approximately half of that population being
female), then this means survival of female-biters with the OX513A gene and potential
egg-layers to sustain the GE trait in third generations and beyond. Reeves et al. (2012)
also state that ‘OX513A males are only partially sterile, and when they mate with wild
females, they will produce 2.8–4.2% surviving larvae of eggs, half of which will be biting
daughters.’
Tetracycline is present in the environment in wastewater and agricultural systems
because it is used for animal agriculture and human health (Oxitec 2016). Accumulations
of tetracycline antibiotics have been found in living systems and in surface, ground and
waste water (Daghrir and Drogui 2013). There could be bodies of water where the concen-
trations of tetracycline are high enough such that the lethality gene will be repressed in the
OX513A mosquitos that have access to that water. Near the proposed release site in the
Florida Keys, there are two wastewater treatment sites, which could increase concen-
trations of tetracycline in standing pools (Oxitec 2016, 53). Worldwide studies have
reported tetracycline levels in the environment at concentration levels that increase survi-
vability of larvae: 1–3 ng/L survivability doubles number of GE mosquito larva that
emerge from about 4–8%, and general environmental concentrations have been reported
at 1.4 ng/L with some reaching the microgram per liter range near wastewater or hospital
sites (Oxitec 2016, 53). Oxitec assumes (without testing standing water in the Florida
Keys) that sunlight will degrade the tetracycline down to no-effect level concentrations
near the wastewater sites and that the only concentration that matters is the one that
increases mosquito emergence from 4% to over 60% in the microgram per liter range
(µg/L) (Oxitec 2016, 53).
It would have been reasonable for the company to have tested standing water near
homes in the Florida Keys, and used the data in a risk analysis to determine what levels
of tetracycline exist in the area of release and what proportion of larva are likely to
emerge at those environmentally relevant concentrations. The EA also did not take into
consideration the relevance of tetracycline concentrations that cause between 4% and
60% mosquito emergence (i.e. between 1 ng/L and 1 µg/L) even though it is plausible
that those levels of the chemical could be found at the proposed field trial site. In any
case, given that about 4% of second generation larvae will survive even in the absence
of tetracycline, and more GE mosquitos will survive in concentrations of tetracycline in
the environment above 1 ng/L (the level routinely found in the environment), there is
likely to be a higher proportion of females with the OX513A gene in the environment
than acknowledged in Oxitec’s EA or the FDA’s FONSI statements. However, the
agency did not require of Oxitec that it address these significant omissions in its EA.
That raises troubling questions about the agency’s efforts to meet its obligation to
protect public health and foster biotechnological innovation.
Oxitec indicates that the field trial will involve the release of GE mosquitos up to three
times a week for up to 22 months (Oxitec 2016, 38). With every release, about 0.1% GE
females are released (the separation efficiency of the GEmosquitos by sex in the laboratory
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is about 99.9% effective). These three sources of leakage in the system – released GE
females, imperfect operation of the molecular repressor system and presence of tetra-
cycline in the environment – mean that GE mosquitos may persist in the environment,
even if their percentage may be relatively small in contrast to their wild-type counterparts.
This possibility is not quantified, and survivability of the GE insect over time is not
modeled under the field trial conditions in the EA document, leaving the question of per-
sistence unanswered.
Moreover, the EA report that Oxitec submitted to the FDA does not attempt to model
the proportion of GE to non-GE mosquitos over time, nor does it present an uncertainty
analysis to calculate the distribution of possible prevalence of GE mosquitos and the like-
lihood at each prevalence. The agency decision to not require of the company that it
perform quantitative risk or exposure assessment with uncertainty (in order to factor in
variation over sustained multiple releases) is worrisome. It appears to unjustifiably dis-
count the concerns that some groups may have expressed about the persistence of the
GE organism in the environment even after the field trial is over.
The FDA also makes the following (arguably unwarranted) claim in its FONSI docu-
ment about the duration of the trial and spread:
Risk of establishment or spread has been determined to be negligible. The investigational trial
is short in duration and any unanticipated adverse effects are unlikely to be widespread or
persistent in the environment. (FDA 2016)
It is a matter of perspective whether releases for 2 years, up to three times a week (300
releases) ‘with sustained releases that are adapted to the numbers of the A. aegypti in
the environment’ (Oxitec 2016, 37), reflect a trial ‘short in duration.’ Given the infor-
mation provided in the EA, it is also not certain that long-term or widespread impacts
are unlikely.
The FDA FONSI denies the possibility that some GE mosquitos will persist, despite the
evidence of leakiness in the molecular system (as discussed above, about 4%). The agency
asserts,
At the conclusion of the investigational field trial, the OX513A mosquitoes would die off at
the end of their natural lifetimes in the environment (approximately two days) and wild-type
A. aegypti levels are expected to recover to pre-trial numbers. (FDA 2016, 5)
It is arguable whether the agency is justified in making such a strong claim; the detailed
information provided in Oxitec’s (draft) EA statement on leakage in the system and the
survival probabilities of GE mosquitos do not appear to warrant the agency’s conclusion.
The probability of survival of the GE mosquito is low, but it is not zero. The GE mosquito
can survive more than 2 days, especially when tetracycline is present in the environment
(Oxitec 2016, Appendix F, 5). In fact, a high percent (40%) survive more than 2 days in the
absence of tetracycline, with 20% surviving more than 15–20 days (Appendix F, Oxitec
2016). The conclusion, however, strongly suggests that the FONSI interpretation of the
Oxitec data is not rigorous. The FDA’s statements appears to support the environmental
release of mosquito (to the benefit of Oxitec), even in the face of considerable uncertainty.
If survival of the GEmosquito is a serious possibility, what about the probability of their
dispersal in the environment? The Oxitec EA states that because A. aegypti live primarily
in human-managed ecosystems (e.g. tires filled with water outside homes), non-target
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exposure outside of these areas is limited. However, the (draft) EA statement also men-
tions field collection surveys that found that the species can indeed be found in protected
national wildlife areas where endangered animals live, albeit at low frequencies (Oxitec
2016, 44). Instead of requiring Oxitec to account for these (partially) contradictory state-
ments, the FDA’s draft FONSI accepted the declaration about the mosquito’s inability to
thrive outside of human-managed areas.
The agency’s assessment of spread of the GE mosquito in the environment also raises
questions. Some GE mosquitos can indeed survive in subsequent generations and live
more than a few days (as indicated by the graphs on page 6 of Appendix F); thus, some
GE mosquitos could possibly travel over multiple generations to wildlife areas where
non-target impacts could be of greater concern than in the area of the original release.
Yet, the FDA claims that ‘it is extremely unlikely that OX513A mosquitoes would disperse
beyond the trial area’ (FDA 2016, 5). Some studies show that some females can indeed fly
well over 200 m (Oxitec 2016, 66). Moreover, Oxitec’s review of the scientific literature
indicates that passive transport (on ships, trains, cars, etc.) is the primary means by
which the mosquito has spread in Florida, and has even reached California (Oxitec
2016, 66; Gloria-Soria et al. 2014).
FDA also claims in its concise (6 page) FONSI that:
[t]he population of A. aegypti at the proposed site is expected to return to its original levels
upon completion of the proposed investigational trial due to migration of wild type A. aegypti
from areas that did not receive OX513A male mosquitoes. (FDA 2016)
That seems to imply that the A. aegypti mosquitos will necessarily travel in that direction
to (re-)establish a habitat, but that assumption is unwarranted.
The decision to not perform quantitative risk assessment, collect data in the field trial to
enable an assessment, or use outside experts in ‘weight of evidence’ or Bayesian expert eli-
citation approaches are a value-laden choices. There is sufficient data available to model
the prevalence of the mosquitos over time with uncertainty reflected in distributions of
possible values. The EA could have calculated the number of females and males mosquitos
released, the survival of larva in the second generation due to the leakiness of the molecu-
lar construct and presence of tetracycline, and the spread over geographic areas. Oxitec
and the FDA employ language that is vague and seems to downplay the non-zero prob-
ability of survival and spread because they did not perform a quantitative assessment as
part of the EA. If a quantitative assessment had been conducted, the transparency of
the evaluation would have been greater (e.g. ‘10–1000 females surviving in a 5-mile
range’ makes the exposure to the mosquito ‘highly unlikely’).
In the EA statement, Oxitec chose to use a qualitative risk assessment method that com-
bines phrases of ‘likelihood’ with phrases of ‘consequence’ to estimate ‘risk’ qualitatively
(Oxitec 2016, 102). The EA statement includes a table with various pathways and end-
points for different potential risks. Most of these risk pathways have a likelihood of
‘highly unlikely’ and a consequence of ‘minor’ or ‘marginal,’ thus putting Oxitec’s
overall estimation of risk for these various harms considered in the table at ‘negligible.’
In contrast to the approach used by Oxitec, the FDA’s FONSI uses different and somewhat
contradictory language to characterize the risk. The agency states that ‘[b]ecause risk is a
function of hazard and exposure, if exposures are negligible, risk will also be negligible’
(FDA 2016). However, in the Oxitec EA’s risk assessment framework, exposures are not
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categorized using the term ‘negligible’; the biotechnology company characterizes the
exposures as ranging from ‘highly likely’ to ‘highly unlikely.’ The FDA’s statement is
also at odds with risk assessment scholarship. For example, low levels of a very toxic com-
pound, such as ricin, can lead to greater severity of illness and thus greater risk upon lower
exposures when compared to compounds that are less toxic. Also, fault tree analysis for
low probability yet high-consequence events (like a nuclear power accident) is a standard
approach in risk analysis. A low probability of events (or exposures) can lead to high risk if
the impacts are severe. For example, an Australian risk assessment group chose to model a
GM mosquito (with the bacterium Wolbachia) and population suppression risk with a
fault tree, which considered multiple pathways of failure and endpoints for human and
ecological health, social impacts and economic effects (Murphy et al. 2010). This
method of risk assessment would have been more appropriate for the Oxitec GE mosquito
than the one employed by Oxitec and the FDA.
Uncertainty is also evaluated qualitatively in the Oxitec EA statement. For example, the
EA states,
The potential likelihood (of the OX513A mosquito)… establish[ing] in the environment has
a medium confidence of uncertainty, because it would require detailed information on each
environmental variable that could affect establishment, such as temperature, humidity, larval
competition, predation, breeding site, container, vegetation etc. Even if such information
were available, the interactions of the environmental factors and the organism itself would
still provide a degree of uncertainty in the analysis. (Oxitec 2016, 118)
Yet, Oxitec then states (in the same paragraph) that there is a ‘high degree of cer-
tainty that the OX513A is unlikely to establish in the environment’ (Oxitec 2016, 118).
To state the obvious, it is contradictory for the EA to simultaneously claim that the
potential for establishment is of ‘moderate uncertainty’ and ‘high degree of certainty.’
Instead of imprecise and conflicting qualitative descriptions of uncertainty, the FDA
and Oxitec assessments could have portrayed the uncertainty and variability for
each parameter through the use of probability distributions, or used expert judgement
to derive these distributions through fault or event tree models (see, for instance,
Murphy et al. 2010).
In rendering its decision in the FONSI, the FDA does not address the (above men-
tioned) lack of data as well as the overall uncertainty (FDA 2016):
The consequences of escape, survival, and establishment of the OX153A mosquito in the
environment have been extensively studied: data and information from those studies indi-
cate that there are unlikely to be any adverse effects on non-target species, including
humans. Risk of establishment or spread has been determined to be negligible. The inves-
tigational trial is short in duration and any unanticipated adverse effects are unlikely to be
widespread or persistent in the environment. Most importantly, the status of the environ-
ment is restored when releases are stopped (i.e. the released mosquitoes all die, and the
environment reverts to the pre-trial status). FDA has therefore made the preliminary
finding that the proposed field trial would not individually or cumulatively have a signifi-
cant effect on the quality of the human environment in the United States, and is issuing this
preliminary FONSI.
As of now, there is no field trial data for escape, survival or establishment in Florida; only
limited field trial data on efficacy are available for other locations where Oxitec has
released the OX513A mosquito strain. Field trials in the Cayman Islands and Brazil
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have shown a temporary reduction in A. agypti populations in the trial site (Harris et al.
2011; Carvalho et al. 2015). As yet there are no published scientific reports that the GE
mosquito will reduce the disease in human populations (Boëte and Reeves 2016).
Second, according to the information provided by Oxitec to the public, the company
has not monitored non-target impacts, population replacement and human health
impacts in past releases (of the GE mosquito) in other countries. Furthermore, while
the risk of OX513A establishment in the environment was determined by Oxitec to
have ‘moderate uncertainty,’ much more data would be required to ‘reduce’ that uncer-
tainty. Third, not everyone would consider 2 years of mosquito release up to three
times per week a ‘short’ trial period. Fourth, the released mosquitos will not all die
within a 2-day period, and there is some uncertainty about whether GE mosquitos will
establish in the target area or spread to other locations. To sum up, multiple value judge-
ments are embedded within Oxitec EA statement and FDA’s FONSI document. The
FDA’s acceptance of qualitative interpretations from Oxitec’s risk assessment seems to
raise questions about the agency’s efforts to meet its obligation to foster biotechnological
innovation even as it seeks to protect public health and the environment.
An alternative way forward
Given the shortcomings of the (draft) risk assessment and (preliminary) FONSI for the GE
mosquito, we recommend that the FDA makes significant changes in its risk evaluation
protocol as it attempts to regulate other GE animals. This is especially important for
the case of self-sustaining gene drives where the assessment of risks prior to field trials
is crucial given the potential that the genetic modification could affect the entire species
in an ecosystem or the larger series of interconnected ecosystems.
The agency should begin by acknowledging that its risk assessments are shaped by
normative considerations, and it should require of the developers and sponsors of new
biotechnologies that they do the same. To reiterate, any and all values influencing risk
assessments (such as the FDA’s commitment to fostering the biotechnology sector and
the desire of the sponsor of the GE animal to have their ‘product’ reach the marketplace
as soon as possible) must be acknowledged. It will also be crucial that they identify the
‘junctures’ in the risk evaluation process where those values are at work (Kuzma and
Besley 2008), so they can be publicly interrogated.
The transparency will mean at least three things. First, the agency will either not be able
to refuse to engage the normative concerns of the public on the grounds that it is inapplic-
able to its work or it will have to justify why public’s normative concerns are not applicable
when the normative concerns of the agency and developers are relevant. Second, the
agency and biotechnology sponsors will not be able to employ (traditional) scientific con-
ceptions of risk and safety to dismiss those worries as lacking scientific merit and thus any
significance (Thompson 1997). And third, the normative concerns that shape any risk
assessment will be available for public deliberations. Such risk assessments will be less
likely (compared with risk evaluations generated under the current risk assessment proto-
col) to foster the biotechnology industry’s interests without the public’s scrutiny and
consent. That will do much to inspire warranted public confidence in the agency regulat-
ory efforts, and ensure that it abides by the NASEM’s recommendations about public
engagement in decision-making about gene drives (NASEM 2016). Our larger point is
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that transparency will open the door to the engagement of multiple experts, stakeholders
and publics in a more democratic risk assessment process, which will control for unac-
knowledged and unchallenged biases, resulting in more rigorous risk assessments than
the current ones. In other words, transparency will bear ethical, political and epistemic
(read: scientific) fruits.
The (above) fundamental and broad shifts in the risk assessment protocol must be
accompanied by specific changes. Some of the ways in which the rigor of the risk assess-
ment could be bolstered include additional justification for the interpretation of presented
data, opening up the risk assessment process to outside experts, use of probability distri-
butions to characterize uncertainty and incorporation of models to consider low prob-
ability events (such as fault trees). In the case of gene drives, the collection of additional
data on non-target impacts in laboratory or mesocosm studies is also warranted (Oye
et al. 2014). These changes will be of particular importance for animals with gene
drives, given their ability to suppress or cause changes in species within multiple
ecosystems.
Conclusion
Given the 2009 Guidance and recent updates to the CFRB (FDA 2009, revised 2015 &
2017; White House [2015] 2016), some animals with gene drives15 may to be categorized
under the NAD provisions and the same regulatory processes as the 2016 classification of
the OX153A mosquito. There are similarities in the risk endpoints of concern between
animals (including non-mosquito insects) with gene drives designed for population sup-
pression and the OX153A mosquito (e.g. consequences of decline of a population and
impacts on predator–prey relationships). Furthermore, ecological risks associated with
the spread of GE animals and animals engineered with gene drives fall in (similar)
general categories (e.g. harm to non-target species from consumption, horizontal gene
flow and impacts, etc.), although the pathways to those risks may change, as well as the
temporal and geographic dimensions (see NASEM 2017).
In this paper, we used an example of existing regulatory practices to identify key pro-
blematic assumptions in an FDA’s risk assessment. On the basis of that analysis, we have
offered recommendations for improving the FDA’s risk analysis process for animals with
gene drives. We urge their adoption by the agency before it is faced with the challenge of
regulating such entities. Particular care is called for in initiating field trials for animals with
gene drives.
For the sake of fulfilling its mission to protect the environment and public health, to
increase the reliability and credibility of its regulatory review, and to invite warranted
public confidence in its regulatory activities (whilst avoiding even the semblance of bias
towards the biotechnology industry), the FDA should re-shape its regulatory process to
allow for broader study of possible ecological impacts, including impacts on humans. It
should also give public constituencies the opportunity to participate in a substantive
sense by deciding which values should shape the risk assessment of GEOs (see, for
instance, NRC 1996 or Meghani and Kuzma 2011; Meghani 2014). Given the ability of
gene drives (especially self-sustaining ones) to permanently alter or eradicate populations
in the wild within an ecosystem or across ecosystems, it is crucial that the public(s) in the
US and other nations jointly have this opportunity.
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Notes
1. CRISPR denotes Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats. Cas9 is a nucle-
ase that makes cuts in DNA next to CRISPR sequences. These have been engineered and har-
nessed for gene editing.
2. Plants pests are to be regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).
3. We use ‘GE’ in this paper to indicate organisms manipulated in the laboratory by modern
biotechnology methods such as recombinant DNA technology and gene editing. Note that
‘genetically modified’ (GM) is used often in countries outside of the US.
4. The Oxitec mosquito that is the subject of this paper is currently under the regulatory auth-
ority of the EPA. The FDA had originally laid claim to regulatory power over the GE mos-
quito on the grounds that the rDNA construct introduced into the mosquito qualified as a
drug. In February 2016, Oxitec submitted the draft EA that it had prepared to the agency.
A month later, the agency issued a preliminary FONSI statement. (This paper was written
in the wake of the issuance of the draft EA and FONSI.) After soliciting public comments
on the draft Environmental Assessment and preliminary (FDA) FONSI, in August 2016,
the FDA posted on its website its (final) Environmental Assessment and FONSI. Then, in
October 2017, the FDA issued the guidance document, ‘Clarification of FDA and EPA Jur-
isdiction Over Mosquito-Related Products.’ In it, the agency ceded authority over GE mos-
quitos, including the Oxitec mosquitos, which have a pesticide function to the EPA. This
change of regulatory jurisdiction for the GE mosquito was justified on the grounds that in
1975 Congress had amended the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act’s defi-
nition of ‘pesticide’:
to exclude any article that is a ‘new animal drug’ within the meaning of the FD&C Act.
Since the FIFRA definition of pesticide was amended in 1975, EPA has registered, as
pesticides, articles that control the population of mosquitoes by killing them or inter-
fering with their reproduction, which is consistent with FDA’s and EPA’s general
agreement that articles or categories of articles that control the population of mosqui-
toes are most appropriately regulated as pesticides. This general agreement arises from
a careful consideration of Congressional intent. (FDA 2017, 5)
Presumably, both regulatory agencies were aware of the 1975 change to FIFRA, but it was only
in October 2017 that the FDA ceded regulatory authority over the GE mosquito to the EPA.
5. We do not focus on whether risk assessment is itself appropriate and sufficient for making
decisions about emerging technologies; others have written about that question elsewhere
(Wickson 2007). Instead, we acknowledge that at least practically, risk assessments
through the federal agencies will be the norm for decision-making for the foreseeable
future. White House executive orders and federal agency policies give risk assessment a prin-
cipal role in US regulatory policy.
6. This section draws on Meghani (2014).
7. For a carefully detailed account of the change in the FDA’s risk assessments practices, see
Hilts (2003).
8. According to Hilts, beginning in the 1980s, FDA reviewers routinely ‘offered detailed advice
(to developers of pharmaceuticals) on what studies were needed and how they should be
designed’ (2003, 228). Prior to the 1980s, FDA reviewers ‘were not permitted to give
company scientists guidance about what evidence would be sufficient to prove a drug’s
safety and effectiveness’ (2003, 228).
9. For a critique of the ‘clarification’ process see Kuzma (2016).
10. While there are currently no guidelines for the risk assessment of animals with gene drives (as
mentioned above), both the NASEM (2016) and the WHO use guidelines for ‘regular’ GE
insects such as the OX513A mosquito to consider risk assessment for gene drives in animals.
11. A synthetic gene for the tetracycline transcriptional activator variant protein (tTAV) is intro-
duced into the mosquito and acts as a tetracycline-regulated switch. High level expression of
tTAV is deleterious to cells, as it represses normal transcriptional function. In the presence of
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tetracycline, tTAV is repressed, so that the GE mosquito can be reared in the laboratory. In
the absence of tetracycline, tTAV is active and kills the cells. The assumption is that the non-
laboratory environment does not contain enough tetracycline for the GE mosquitos to
survive.
12. In November 2016, Florida residents approved the release of the GE mosquitos on the
basis of a public referendum but the town of Key Haven that was the site of the
release rejected it. In the US, as of October 2017, no field trial of OX153A has taken
place in the US.
13. Needless to say, the decision to classify the rDNA construct that is lethal to the animal in
which it has been introduced (and its progeny) as a new animal drug has the odd result of
the agency attempting to ascertain its safety for that organism because by law the FDA is
obligated to determine whether new drugs are safe for the entities to which they are
prescribed.
14. See for instance Oye et al. (2014) about other important variables that should be measured.
15. The exceptions are the GE mosquitos that are intended to function as pesticides.
Funding
The workshop was funded by the National Science Foundation – SES and Science in Society
Program [grant number 1533990] with additional co-funding by the Genetic Engineering and
Society Center (GES) at North Carolina State University (NCSU) and the Center for Nanotechnol-
ogy in Society at Arizona State University. The views, however, are those of the authors and not
these institutions.
Notes on contributors
As a philosopher with a specialization in ethics, Dr Zahra Meghani’s work is in the area of environ-
mental ethics. She has a number of peer reviewed publications on the normativity of risk assessment
of genetically engineered food. In particular, she examines the influence of neoliberalism on the US
food regulatory system. Her aim is to identify and develop the theoretical underpinnings of a regu-
latory review process for genetically modified food that is transparent, unbiased, inclusive and
democratic. She is also engaged in health care ethics research. The inequitable distribution of
health care resources between different groups at the national and international level is the focus
of her research. She is an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of
Rhode Island.
Jennifer Kuzma is the Goodnight-NCGSK Foundation Distinguished Professor in Social Sciences
and co-director of the Genetic Engineering and Society Center at NC State University. Prior to
this position she was a faculty member in science and technology policy at the Humphrey
School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota (2003–2013); study director at the National Aca-
demies of Science in Washington DC for genetic engineering and bioterrorism (1999–2003); and a
AAAS Risk Policy Fellow at the US Dept. of Agriculture (1997–1999). She has over 100 scholarly
publications on emerging technologies and governance; and has been studying genetic engineering
and its societal aspects for over 25 years. She discovered that bacteria product isoprene, a precursor
to natural rubber, during from her PhD work in biochemistry, and her postdoctoral work in plant
molecular biology resulted in a publication in the journal Science. She has held several leadership
positions, including the Society for Risk Analysis Council & Secretary, Chair of the Gordon Con-
ference on S&T Policy, the FDA Blood Products Advisory Committee, and the UN WHO-FAO
Expert Group for Nanotechnologies in Food and Agriculture. In 2014, she received the Society
for Risk Analysis Sigma Xi Distinguished Lecturer Award for recognition of her outstanding con-
tributions to the field of risk analysis. She has been called upon in national media for her expertise
on genetic engineering policy issues, including recently in the Washington Post, Scientific Amer-
ican, New York Times, 2015 World’s Fair exhibit, Nature, and National Public Radio.
JOURNAL OF RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION S219
References
Barben, D., E. Fisher, C. Selin, and D. H. Guston. 2008. “Anticipatory Governance of
Nanotechnology: Foresight, Engagement, and Integration.” In The Handbook of Science and
Technology Studies, edited by E. Hackett, O. Amsterdamska, M. Lynch, and J. Wajcman, 979–
1000. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Barley, S. R. 2007. “Corporations, Democracy, and the Public Good.” Journal of Management
Inquiry 16 (3): 201–215.
Boëte, C., and R. G. Reeves. 2016. “Alternative Vector Control Methods to Manage the Zika Virus
Outbreak: More Haste, Less Speed.” The Lancet Global Health 4 (6): e363.
Burt, A. 2003. “Site-Specific Selfish Genes as Tools for the Control and Genetic Engineering of
Natural Populations.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 270
(1518): 921–928.
Carvalho, D. O., A. R. McKemey, L. Garziera, R. Lacroix, C. A. Donnelly, L. Alphey, A. Malavasi, and
M. L. Capurro. 2015. “Suppression of a Field Population of Aedes aegypti in Brazil by Sustained
Release of Transgenic Male Mosquitoes.” Plos Neglected Tropical Diseases 9 (7): e0003864.
Cowan, T., and K. Alexander. 2012. Deregulating Genetically Engineered Alfalfa and Sugar Beets:
Legal and Administrative Responses. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
Daghrir, R., and P. Drogui. 2013. “Tetracycline Antibiotics in the Environment: A Review.”
Environmental Chemistry Letters 11 (3): 209–227.
Esvelt, K. M., A. L. Smidler, F. Catteruccia, and G. M. Church. 2014. “Concerning RNA-guided
Gene Drives for the Alteration of Wild Populations.” Elife 3: 20131071.
FDA. 1992. “Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties.” Federal Register 57:
22984–23005.
FDA. 2017. “Clarification of FDA and EPA Jurisdiction over Mosquito-related Products.”
Revised October 2017. https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplian
ceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM533600.pdf.
FDA-CVM. 2008. “FDA’s Response to Public Comments on Draft Guidance for Industry #187.”
September 19. https://www.fda.gov/animalveterinary/developmentapprovalprocess/geneticeng
ineering/geneticallyengineeredanimals/ucm113612.htm.
FDA-CVM. 2009. “Guidance for Industry Regulation of Intentionally Altered Genomic DNA in
Animals #187.” Revised 2015 & 2017. https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/
GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/ucm113903.pdf.
FDA-CVM. 2016. “Preliminary Finding of No Significant Impact in Support of an Investigational
Field Trial of OX513A Aedes aegyptiMosquitoes.” http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeteri
nary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/UCM4
87379.pdf.
Federal Register. 1981. “Executive Order 12291 – Federal Regulation.” Federal Register 46: 13193.
Federal Register. 1984. “Biotechnology Regulation, Coordinated Framework; Inquiry.” Federal
Register 49: 50856.
Gantz, V. M., N. Jasinskiene, O. Tatarenkova, A. Fazekas, V. M. Macias, E. Bier, and A. A. James.
2015. “Highly Efficient Cas9-Mediated Gene Drive for Population Modification of the Malaria
Vector Mosquito Anopheles stephensi.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112
(49): E6736–E6743.
Gloria-Soria, A., J. E. Brown, V. Kramer, M. Hardstone Yoshimizu, and J. R. Powell. 2014. “Origin
of the Dengue Fever Mosquito Aedes aegypti, in California.” PLoS NTD 8 (7): e3029.
Hammond, A., R. Galizi, K. Kyrou, A. Simoni, C. Siniscalchi, D. Katsanos, M. Gribble, et al. 2016.
“A CRISPR-Cas9 Gene Drive System Targeting Female Reproduction in the Malaria Mosquito
Vector Anopheles gambiae.” Nature Biotechnology 34 (1): 78–83.
Harris, A. F., A. R. McKemey, D. Nimmo, Z. Curtis, I. Black, S. A. Morgan, M. N. Oviedo, et al.
2012. “Successful Suppression of a Field Mosquito Population by Sustained Release of
Engineered Male Mosquitoes.” Nature Biotechnology 30 (9): 828–830.
S220 Z. MEGHANI AND J. KUZMA
Harris, A. F., D. Nimmo, A. R. McKemey, N. Kelly, S. Scaife, C. A. Donnelly, C. Beech, W. D. Petrie,
and L. Alphey. 2011. “Field Performance of Engineered Male Mosquitoes.” Nature Biotechnology
29 (11): 1034–1037.
Harvey, D. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Oxford University Press.
Hilts, P.J. 2003. Protecting America’s Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of
Regulation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Jasanoff, S. 2005. Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Keat et al. v. U.S. DHHS FDA. 2016. “Case 3:16-cv-01574 Document 1 Filed 03/30/16.” http://www.
centerforfoodsafety.org/files/2016-3-30-dkt-1--pls--complaint_94703.pdf.
Keyworth, G. 1981. “Testimony. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Science
and Technology.” https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1982-pt8/pdf/GPO-CRECB-
1982-pt8-5-1.pdf
Kuzma, J. 2016. “A Missed Opportunity for US Biotechnology Regulation.” Science 353 (6305):
1211–1213.
Kuzma, J., and J. C. Besley. 2008. “Ethics of Risk Analysis and Regulatory Review: From Bio-To
Nanotechnology.” Nanoethics 2 (2): 149–162.
Kuzma, J., F. Gould, Z. S. Brown, J. P. Collins, J. A. Delborne, E. Frow, K. Esvelt, et al. 2017. “A
Roadmap for Gene Drives: Using Institutional Analysis and Development to Frame Research
Needs and Governance in a Systems Context.” Journal of Responsible Innovation 5 (S1):
S13–S39. doi:10.1080/23299460.2017.1410344.
Levidow, L., J. Murphy, and S. Carr. 2007. “Recasting ‘Substantial Equivalence’: Transatlantic
Governance of GM Food.” Science, Technology, & Human Values 32 (1): 26–64.
Markel, H. 2005. “Why America Needs a Strong FDA.” Journal of the American Medical Association
294: 2489–2491.
Meghani, Z. 2014. “Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Food and Neoliberalism: An
Argument for Democratizing the Regulatory Review Protocol of the Food and Drug
Administration.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 27 (6): 967–989.
Meghani, Z. 2017a. “Regulations of Consumer Products.” In Consumer Perception of Product Risks
and Benefits, edited by G. Emilien, R. Weitkunat, and F. Luedicke, 495–513. Dordrecht: Springer.
Meghani, Z. 2017b. “Genetically Engineered Animals, Drugs, and Neoliberalism: The Need for a
New Biotechnology Regulatory Policy Framework.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental
Ethics. Advance online publication. doi:10.1007/s10806-017-9696-1.
Meghani, Z., and J. Kuzma. 2011. “The ‘Revolving Door’ Between Regulatory Agencies and
Industry: A Problem That Requires Reconceptualizing Objectivity.” Journal of Agricultural
And Environmental Ethics 24 (6): 575–599.
Meghani, Z., and I. Melo-Martín. 2009. “The US Food and Drug Administration’s Evaluation of the
Safety of Animal Clones: A Failure to Recognize the Normativity of Risk Assessment Projects.”
Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 29 (1): 9–17.
Murphy, B., C. Jansen, J. Murray, and P. De Barro. 2010. Risk Analysis on the Australian Release of
Aedes aegypti (L.)(Diptera: Culicidae) Containing Wolbachia. Canberra: CSIRO. http://www.
eliminatedengue.com/library/publication/document/csiro_report_australia_2010.pdf.
NASEM. 2016. Gene Drives on the Horizon: Advancing Science, Navigating Uncertainty, and
Aligning Research with Public Values. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
NASEM. 2017. Preparing for Future Products of Biotechnology. Washington, DC: National
Academies Press.
Nimmo, D. D., and C. Beech. 2016. “Genetically Engineered Mosquitoes in the US.” Outlooks on
Pest Management 26 (5): 207–210.
NRC. 1996. Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society. Washington, DC:
National Academies Press.
Otts, S. S. 2014. “US Regulatory Framework for Genetic Biocontrol of Invasive Fish.” Biological
Invasions 16 (6): 1289–1298.
JOURNAL OF RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION S221
Oxitec. 2016. “Draft Environmental Assessment for Investigational Use of Aedes aegypti OX513A.”
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/
GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/ucm446529.htm.
Oye, K. A., K. Esvelt, E. Appleton, F. Catteruccia, G. Church, T. Kuiken, S. Bar-Yam Lightfoot, J.
McNamara, A. Smidler, and J. P. Collins. 2014. “Regulating Gene Drives.” Science 345: 626–628.
Parthasarathy, S. 2012. Building Genetic Medicine. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Reagan, R. 1982. “Message to the Congress Transmitting the Annual Economic Report of the
President.” http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/21082a.htm.
Reeves, R. G., J. A. Denton, F. Santucci, J. Bryk, and F. A. Reed. 2012. “Scientific Standards and the
Regulation of Genetically Modified Insects.” PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases 6 (1): e1502.
Thompson, P. B. 1997. “Science Policy and Moral Purity: The Case of Animal Biotechnology.”
Agriculture and Human Values 14 (1): 11–27.
Unlu, M. 2009. “It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data.” Michigan
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 16: 511.
USDA. 2017. “Petitions for Determination of Nonregulated Status.” https://www.aphis.usda.gov/
aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/permits-notifications-petitions/petitions/petition-status.
White House. [2015] 2016. “Modernizing the Regulatory System for Biotechnology Products: An
Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology.” https://www.epa.
gov/regulation-biotechnology-under-tsca-and-fifra/modernizing-regulatory-system-
biotechnology-products.
Wickson, F. 2007. “From Risk to Uncertainty in the Regulation of GMOs: Social Theory and
Australian Practice.” New Genetics and Society 26 (3): 325–339.
S222 Z. MEGHANI AND J. KUZMA
